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Medical Research Ethics: Introduction
Medical Research Ethics is a rapidly developing area in both the philosophical and public policy arenas.
And as should be expected, the discipline is suffering from a number of growing pains. First, there are
the perennial problems associated with the field which still require a great deal of time and effort to
examine. Questions, such as, How much information is required to obtain informed consent? What does
it mean to freely consent for informed consent? How do we ethically incorporate groups that have been
excluded from medical testing, such as woman, as well as groups that have been historically exploited by
researchers, such as black men, the mentally disabled, and prisoners? have been wrestled with since the
middle of the 19th century when scientists began to pay serious consideration to how research affected
human subjects.1 Although progress has been made in defining and developing ethical codes for conduct
in research, especially after the Nazi atrocities were discovered, it is obvious there is a long way to go
before the codes are complete. The fundamental concept of autonomy, for example, is still not as clear as
it needs to be for evaluating moral claims, even though the basic requirements of autonomy have been
recognized by a number of people.2
Furthermore, as we discover that the set of moral considerations for ethical decision making is
greater than we perceived previously, we find new complexities for the perennials. For example, the
developed world’s researchers and policy makers often have very little insight into the developing
world’s practices and customs. What might count as informed consent in the developed world
would be insufficient in some areas outside of it. In one case, researchers for a study conducted in
an African community in which the tribal leaders have enormous power in setting the community’s
goals sought informed consent from both the leaders and the human subjects.3 The study used a
higher standard than that found in the developed world, in which community leaders are not asked
for their informed consent to participate in the research. With the greater awareness of moral
considerations in research situations, the definition of informed consent might have to be modified
accordingly. The remaining perennial issues are likely to be effected in a similar manner, which sets
the stage for an extensive re-examination of currently accepted standards and practices.
The introduction of new technology causes a second growing pain for Medical Research Ethics:
New technology creates new moral problems. Medical Research Ethics tries to address future
issues, such as the alteration of hog DNA to make the species a viable source for human transplants,
but because of the speed of technological advancements, the field is often struggling merely to keep
pace with developments as they occur. The work done so far on the perennial questions is useful
but insufficient to solve the problem. The difficulty is that although the new problems might be
similar to the perennials, the former have unique moral features that require a great deal of
additional evaluation. For example, the moral issues involved with pharmaceutical transgenic
organisms, in which DNA from one species is “spliced” into that of another to create new
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/cooleyintro.html[9/18/2009 5:06:32 PM]
pharmaceutical products, have only recently begun to receive the attention that they deserve. The
available literature on the perennial issues lays some groundwork for answering the old questions of
morality, such as the duties to make the products available to all citizens, animals, and the
environment, but it does not say anything about the morality of this type of transgenics. Some of
the transgenic issues are distinctive in that they require the evaluation of technology that was
thought to be science fiction a mere twenty years ago. New questions about the intrinsic moral
value of pharmaceutical organisms, for instance, need to be fully addressed before we can make
decisions about whether or not to introduce such products into the marketplace. Medical Research
Ethics’ growing pain becomes especially acute as the number of developments outpaces the
resources of those trained properly in the field.
A third growing pain can be found in the struggle of social and political policymakers to catch up to
medical research developments and relationships. Due to the increase in conflicts of interests, for
example, the federal government is beginning the process of formulating rules for Institutional
Review Boards4 (IRBs) to manage conflicts.5 University researchers have recently developed ties to
corporations, which provide funding for their research and sometimes expect the researchers to fully
support conclusions that benefit the company, or at least finesse results in its favor. Even without
the illicit pressure to alter results, the fiscal relationship between researchers and corporations might
be in conflict with the interests of the university or the public it serves. The university and public
expect unbiased research, which can be used to make good decisions. In these situations,
researchers might not be able to serve their three masters well.
Another questionable financial relationship is the relatively new phenomenon of university
researchers forming corporations of their own to profit from the results of their research. This sets
up conflicts of interests between the universities, researchers, and everyone else involved in the
process. Researchers have a financial interest in the success of their corporation, which might be in
conflict with the interests of the university to produce unbiased research. Furthermore, the
university, itself, might be unduly influenced to relax its strive for objective research by the
possibility of financial gain through the corporation, a part of which the university might own. In
these situations, the duty of the university to the students or the public might be subverted for the
profit that could be made.
Finally, IRB members might have conflicts of interests of their own. Since experts in the research
areas are needed to evaluate research protocols for scientific validity as well as ethical legitimacy,
the experts tend to come from the same department as the researchers. Hence, there are at least
apparent conflicts between the interests of the department, university, and human subjects, which
need to be addressed. To complicate matters further, if the IRB member has an unequal power
relationship with the researcher, e.g., one will be making tenure decisions for the other, there is an
even greater probability that the conflict will produce unethical results.
IRBs are in a bad situation. It has been clear for some time that IRBs need rules to help them do the
right thing in all conflict of interest situations, but policymakers have not provided it. However,
even though official rules are not in place, it would be unethical to stop research that has conflicts
until the rules have been codified. IRBs will have to continue to try to do what is ethical without
much outside guidance.
Although there are far more issues in Medical Research Ethics that can be addressed, including but
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not limited to stem cell research, human cloning, and genetic therapies, the enormous complexity
and challenges of this developing field should now be apparent. The main question that we in the
field should be considering is how to ethically proceed with developing Medical Research Ethics.
My suggestion is to make an effort to see if we have set the groundwork needed to make useful
progress in field. That requires going back to the basics of philosophical study.
Relatively early in their careers, philosophers learn by heart an old adage: Questions of meaning
come before questions of truth. Basically, if the definitions of words or terms are unclear in the
propositions in which they appear, then it is impossible to evaluate the truth of the propositions, or
the principles, arguments, or theories that contain the propositions. In the abortion debate, for
example, the pro-choice side often defines the unborn as fetuses, while the pro-life side claims that
the unborn are babies or children. Regardless of who is truly right or wrong, arguments using the
word “unborn” cannot be evaluated until it is clear which definition, if either, is intended.
Philosophical reasoning, hence, is judged adequate or inadequate based in part upon how well the
words and terms employed are defined.
The two papers and my book review in this issue of Essays in Philosophy take the adage seriously.
First, Richard Miller’s paper takes on what is one of the most influential works in Medical Research
Ethics: The Belmont Report. The Belmont Report’s three rules of morality have been the basis of
most of the various codes of conduct formulated by public and private agencies involved in research
ethics. The National Institutes of Health’s Office for Human Subjects Research, among others, has
it listed on their website.6 Furthermore, there is not one textbook in bioethics or medical ethics that
does not refer to the Report as an important component in the literature.
Unfortunately, as Miller convincingly argues, the Report’s guidelines give little assistance in
making ethical decisions. In the first case, the guidelines are full of terms that are so vague or
ambiguous, that the resulting rules cannot be understood. Second, in many instances, when the
terms are sufficiently defined, the guidelines are internally and externally inconsistent. The justice
principle, for example, lists five distributive justice principles, including socialism, egalitarianism,
and capitalism, but provides no guidance in selecting which of the theories to use for any situation,
even though they cannot each be satisfied at the same time. Using the Principle of Charity, the best
that can be said about the Belmont Report is that it recognizes that justice, beneficence, and respect
for persons are good things and necessary features of right actions, although it remains unclear
exactly what role the three play in ethical decision making.
Second, in “Do Unknown Risks Preclude Informed Consent?,” David Rudge argues that Allen
Buchanan and Daniel Brock make an unwarranted presumption that the riskier a therapy is, then the
higher the level of cognitive competence the patient/human subject must have for an informed
decision. Rudge contends that the presumption entails one of two implausible results for
experimental therapies. First, if the competency standard is higher than merely making a reasonable
choice, then most human subjects can never give informed consent because they do not truly
understand the nature of experimental therapies and the risks involved. Second, if the competency
standard is merely making a reasonable choice, then a much lower standard for experimental
therapies is implied. Rudge argues that making a reasonable choice in the face of uncertain odds,
such as when a fiscally naïve person invests successfully in the stock market, is not an informed
decision, due to the lack of relevant information. Hence, instead of having a higher standard of
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competency for human subjects in experimental therapy clinical trials, the competency standard is
lower than that used for the normal or benchmark treatments.
In my review of Adil E. Shamoo and David B. Resnik’s Responsible Conduct of Research, I use
much the same process that Miller employs to such great effect against the Belmont Report.
Although the authors’ moral theory, principles, and guidelines are important ethical considerations
when it comes to making moral decisions, it is not clear how practical their decision making
procedure is. Many terms are left inadequately defined, and some of the rules are contradictory, e.g.,
the justice principle is the same as that of the Belmont Report. The result is that researchers are
more likely to be able to identify the moral considerations situations have, but there is no clear
method to help them make decisions in difficult situations in which those moral considerations are
at odds with each other. In the end, although otherwise an excellent addition to the literature,
Responsible Conduct of Research needs a more practical decision procedure with understandable
components.
What all three articles show is the need to carefully evaluate the literature that has become part of
the foundations of thinking in Medical Research Ethics, instead of trying to formulate policy or
ideas for new developments as they come. Although this method will necessarily impose a hiatus on
some work on newer issues, the additional clarity achieved will be useful in the long run for
formulating the best arguments and preventing a great deal of wasted effort that arises only because
those doing it are ignorant about the emptiness of the terms.
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Notes:
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